Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information

DOI10.3982/TE2237MaRDI QIDQ4586063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William Fuchs, Aniko Öry, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2237

zbMATH Keywords

transparencyadverse selectionmarket designdistress

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
• Transparency of outside options in bargaining
• Market screening with limited records

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