Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.005zbMath1478.91095OpenAlexW3195383231MaRDI QIDQ2667241

Simon Siegenthaler, Arno Riedl, Aurélie Dariel

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationadverse selectionwage formationreferral hiringsocial links

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39)

Related Items

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

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