Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.11.001MaRDI QIDQ2345232zbMATHOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentprivate informationmechanism designincentive theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cited in

(8)

• Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
• Value of screening in procurement mechanism: an experimental study
• Revenue-sharing between developers of virtual products and platform distributors
• Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
• An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
• Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory

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• Z-Tree

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