Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.11.001zbMATH Open1311.91079DBLPjournals/geb/HoppeS15OpenAlexW3121308463WikidataQ55881416 ScholiaQ55881416MaRDI QIDQ2345232FDOQ2345232
Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.001
Recommendations
- Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Moral hazard and adverse selection in procurement contracting
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Game theory
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monopoly and product quality
- Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
- Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game
- Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
- A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- No trade
- No-trade in the laboratory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information
- Optimal Nonuniform Prices
- From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship-an Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power
- Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
- Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*
- Ultimatums in two-person barganining with one-sided uncertainty: Offer games
Cited In (8)
- Value of screening in procurement mechanism: an experimental study
- An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
- Revenue-sharing between developers of virtual products and platform distributors
- Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
- Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2345232)
