Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*

DOI10.1007/S10679-006-8280-8zbMATH Open1125.91336OpenAlexW2030710207MaRDI QIDQ5491071FDOQ5491071

Authors: Elena Asparouhova 

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-006-8280-8

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (14)

• Are High-Interest Loans Predatory? Theory and Evidence from Payday Lending
• Loan market equilibrium with difference of opinion and imperfect competition.
• Signaling in Credit Markets
• Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness *
• Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract
• Are biased beliefs fit to survive? An experimental test of the market selection hypothesis
• Securitization and lending competition
• Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
• Lending terms and aggregate productivity
• The experimental study of asset pricing theory
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• The dynamics of competitive equilibrium allocations with borrowing constraints
• Integrating market conditions into regulatory decisions on microfinance interest rates: does competition matter?
• Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

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