Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*
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Publication:5491071
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- Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
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- The experimental study of asset pricing theory
- Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
- The dynamics of competitive equilibrium allocations with borrowing constraints
- Integrating market conditions into regulatory decisions on microfinance interest rates: does competition matter?
- Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets
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