Moral hazard and adverse selection in procurement contracting

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0100MaRDI QIDQ1363536zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James C. Cox, R. Marc Isaac, Paula-Ann Cech, David Conn

Publication date 10 August 1997

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0100

zbMATH Keywords

post-auction costprocurement contractingsecond-price sealed-bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
• Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study

Cited in

(8)

• The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
• Early selection and moral hazard
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study
• Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
• Uncertainty in procurement contracting with time incentives
• Is there a bias toward excessive quality in defense procurement?

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