BETTER LATER THAN NEVER? AN EXPERIMENT ON BARGAINING UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION

DOI10.1111/iere.12292zbMath1416.91130OpenAlexW2593388070MaRDI QIDQ4685657

Simon Siegenthaler, Olivier Bochet

Publication date: 9 October 2018

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12292

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbargainingadverse selectionexperimental test

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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