Better later than never? An experiment on bargaining under adverse selection

DOI10.1111/IERE.12292MaRDI QIDQ4685657zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Olivier Bochet, Simon Siegenthaler

Publication date 9 October 2018

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12292

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingadverse selectionasymmetric informationexperimental test

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cited in

(4)

• Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection
• The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
• Bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information
• Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining

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