Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00511.xzbMath1137.91399OpenAlexW3121950679MaRDI QIDQ5477761

No author found.

Publication date: 29 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20136

zbMATH Keywords

relational contractsinvoluntary unemploymentimplicit contractsmarket interactionfairness preferencesrepeated transaction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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