The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
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Publication:645667
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.03.006zbMATH Open1274.91122OpenAlexW2296316169MaRDI QIDQ645667FDOQ645667
Authors: Randolph Sloof, Joep Sonnemans
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.006
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Cites Work
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
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- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
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- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Commitment versus discretion in the peasant-dictator game
- The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
Cited In (4)
- Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence
- Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better
- The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
- The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
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