The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Commitment versus discretion in the peasant-dictator game
- Fairness and Contract Design
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
- Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
Cited in
(4)- Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence
- Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better
- The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
- The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
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