Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Discrimination in a segmented society: an experimental approach.
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history: A re-examination
Cited in
(18)- For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
- Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- Similarities and differences when building trust: the role of cultures
- Limited-trust equilibria
- Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games
- Information and learning in oligopoly: an experiment
- Trust and trustworthiness in games: an experimental study of intergenerational advice
- Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence
- Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- Competition fosters trust
- Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game
- Do lies erode trust?
- Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
- An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
- The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
- A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: theory and experimental evidence
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