Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
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Publication:2675395
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105490zbMath1498.91238OpenAlexW4281938157MaRDI QIDQ2675395
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105490
2-person games (91A05) Discrete-time games (91A50) Applications of game theory (91A80) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
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- A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining
- Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information
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