Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

DOI10.3390/g4030457zbMath1314.91158OpenAlexW2026926970MaRDI QIDQ2351242

Joel Watson

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030457

zbMATH Keywords

negotiationagreementsexternal enforcementself-enforcementcontractual equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites Work

• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs
• A model of pre-game communication
• A theory of partnership dynamics
• Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Rational Strategic Choice Revisited
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
• A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining

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