Recommendations
Cites work
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
Cited in
(34)- Implementation via rights structures
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Experimental design to persuade
- Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING
- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- Implementation with partial provability
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Implementation with evidence
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Selling with evidence
- Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
- Long information design
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games
- Regret-minimizing project choice
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
- Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
- Persuasion with verifiable information
- Full surplus extraction and consideration sets
- Robust predictions and hard information in the market for lemons
- Evidence games: lying aversion and commitment
- Unidirectional incentive compatibility
- Project selection with partially verifiable information
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Algorithmic persuasion with evidence
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
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