Full surplus extraction and consideration sets
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Cites work
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Bilateral trading with naive traders
- Consideration sets and competitive marketing
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Level-k mechanism design
- Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry
- Monopoly and product quality
- On the observable restrictions of limited consideration models: theory and application
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Rational inattention, optimal consideration sets, and stochastic choice
- Stochastic choice and consideration sets
- Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
- The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- What do consumers consider before they choose? Identification from asymmetric demand responses
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