Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2031173
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.005zbMath1466.91070OpenAlexW2551355021MaRDI QIDQ2031173
Publication date: 8 June 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.02.005
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Related Items (5)
Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- Mechanism design and intentions
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
- Rationalizable implementation
- Bilateral trading with naive traders
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
- Reasoning about others' reasoning
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
- Optimal Auction Design
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
- Endogenous Depth of Reasoning
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Strategically Simple Mechanisms
- Level-$k$ Mechanism Design
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
This page was built for publication: Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
