Mechanism design and intentions
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Publication:281379
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.013zbMATH Open1369.91063OpenAlexW3125596586MaRDI QIDQ281379FDOQ281379
Authors: Nick Netzer, Felix Bierbrauer 
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013
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Cites Work
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Cited In (14)
- On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Reciprocity with uncertainty about others
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
- Agreements with reciprocity: co-financing and MOUs
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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