Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_9MaRDI QIDQ4614062zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Changjun Wang, Wen-Wei Wang

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_9

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationmechanism designtruthful payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cited in

(4)

• Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy

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