Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_9zbMATH Open1405.91273OpenAlexW2770631831MaRDI QIDQ4614062FDOQ4614062

Authors: Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Changjun Wang, Wen-Wei Wang 

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_9

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zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationmechanism designtruthful payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (4)

• Mechanism design and intentions
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy
• Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

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