Recommendations
Cites work
- Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
- Computing network tolls with support constraints
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Routing games in the wild: efficiency, equilibration and regret. Large-scale field experiments in Singapore
- Routing without regret, on convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Selfish transportation games
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(4)- Instability and concentration in the distribution of wealth
- Minimising inequality in multiagent resource allocation: structural analysis of a distributed approach
- The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context
- The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
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