Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2019.31OpenAlexW2962733547MaRDI QIDQ5090481FDOQ5090481

Authors Kurtuluş Gemici, Elias Koutsoupias, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras, Christos Papadimitriou 

Publication date 18 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09269

zbMATH Keywords

inequalitycongestion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Recommendations

• Price of anarchy for mean field games
• A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games
• Selfishness need not be bad

Cites work

• Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
• Computing network tolls with support constraints
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations
• Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
• Routing games in the wild: efficiency, equilibration and regret. Large-scale field experiments in Singapore
• Routing without regret, on convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Selfish transportation games
• Selfish unsplittable flows
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(4)

• Minimising inequality in multiagent resource allocation: structural analysis of a distributed approach
• The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
• Instability and concentration in the distribution of wealth
• The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context

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