Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy
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Publication:5090481
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2019.31OpenAlexW2962733547MaRDI QIDQ5090481FDOQ5090481
Authors: Kurtuluş Gemici, Elias Koutsoupias, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras, Christos Papadimitriou 
Publication date: 18 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.09269
Cites Work
- Worst-case equilibria
- Computing network tolls with support constraints
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Mechanism Design with Efficiency and Equality Considerations
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Routing without regret, on convergence to Nash equilibria of regret-minimizing algorithms in routing games
- Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
- Selfish Transportation Games
- Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret
Cited In (4)
- Minimising inequality in multiagent resource allocation: structural analysis of a distributed approach
- Instability and concentration in the distribution of wealth
- The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand
- The price of anarchy as a classifier for mechanism design in a Pareto-Bayesian-Nash context
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