Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
- Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
- Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
- Sharing sequential values in a network
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
Cited in
(15)- Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource- allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
- Incentive-compatible allocation algorithm for non-separable group payoffs
- Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
- Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
- Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
- Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
- Strategically simple mechanisms
- An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
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