Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01342-ZMaRDI QIDQ825192zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jung S. You, Ruben Juarez

Publication date 17 December 2021

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z

zbMATH Keywords

envy-freeimplementationcost sharingresource sharingVCG mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms
• Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
• Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
• Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
• Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability
• Sharing sequential values in a network
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

Cited in

(15)

• Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource- allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
• Incentive-compatible allocation algorithm for non-separable group payoffs
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations
• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies
• Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
• Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
• Strategically simple mechanisms
• An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
• Incentive compatibility and informational requirements

This page was built for publication: Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q825192)