Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

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Publication:5955107

DOI10.1007/PL00004200zbMath1087.91509OpenAlexW3123380468MaRDI QIDQ5955107

Scott J. Shenker, Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004200




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