Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: improvement of the supremal welfare loss

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.12.004zbMATH Open1311.91114OpenAlexW2017205104MaRDI QIDQ2345238FDOQ2345238

Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Hiroki Saitoh

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesscost sharingincreasing returnsaverage cost pricinghybrid rulesupremal welfare loss

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
• Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good

Cited In (4)

• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Non-bossiness
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive

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