Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: improvement of the supremal welfare loss
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Publication:2345238
Recommendations
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
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Cites work
- Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good
- Beyond Moulin mechanisms
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
- The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost
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