Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
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Publication:2386316
DOI10.1007/s003550050145zbMath1066.91502OpenAlexW2038644905MaRDI QIDQ2386316
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050145
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