Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_28zbMATH Open1136.91495OpenAlexW1542926844MaRDI QIDQ5459996FDOQ5459996

Guido Schäfer, Janina A. Brenner

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/15610

Recommendations

• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
• Cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling under general demand settings
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Techniques for scheduling with rejection
• Letter to the Editor—A Proof of the Optimality of the Shortest Remaining Processing Time Discipline
• Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Minimizing average completion time in the presence of release dates
• Worst Case Bound of an LRF Schedule for the Mean Weighted Flow-Time Problem
• A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Cost Sharing Methods for Makespan and Completion Time Scheduling
• Minimizing mean flow time with release time constraint
• Fair Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Jobs on Parallel Machines
• Automata, Languages and Programming

Cited In (7)

• Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling under general demand settings
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
• Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games

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