Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.008zbMath1400.91260OpenAlexW2605124523MaRDI QIDQ1651261

Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Mukund Sundararajan, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.127.283

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueapproximate efficiencycost-sharing mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Cost sharing in two-sided markets, Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry, Cost sharing over combinatorial domains : Complement-free cost functions and beyond

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