Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
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Publication:3452219
DOI10.1145/1538902.1538907zbMATH Open1325.91033OpenAlexW2113529747WikidataQ56609429 ScholiaQ56609429MaRDI QIDQ3452219FDOQ3452219
Authors: Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan 
Publication date: 11 November 2015
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1538902.1538907
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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- How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium
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- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
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- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
- Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
- Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
- Cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling under general demand settings
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
- Quantifying the Burden of Exploration and the Unfairness of Free Riding
- Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
- Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- Cost sharing in two-sided markets
- Computing stable coalitions: approximation algorithms for reward sharing
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- Cost-sharing models in participatory sensing
- Minimizing Rosenthal potential in multicast games
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- Cost sharing over combinatorial domains : Complement-free cost functions and beyond
- Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
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