How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium
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Publication:2140279
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.041zbMath1506.91069arXiv2105.02669OpenAlexW3215375171MaRDI QIDQ2140279
Rafał Kucharski, Javier Alonso-Mora, Oded Cats, Andrés Fielbaum
Publication date: 20 May 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02669
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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