Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria

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Publication:3053150

DOI10.1137/08072721XzbMath1207.68164OpenAlexW2162057799MaRDI QIDQ3053150

Ho-Lin Chen, Gregory Valiant, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 4 November 2010

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/08072721x




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