Minimum cost connection networks: truth-telling and implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.009zbMath1330.91110OpenAlexW1993834049MaRDI QIDQ894009

Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/63376/1/MCG.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

implementationcost sharingaxiomatic characterizationtruth-tellingconnection networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (7)

Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ Sharing the cost of risky projects ⋮ Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks ⋮ Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation ⋮ The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games ⋮ Trouble comes in threes: core stability in minimum cost connection networks ⋮ Free intermediation in resource transmission

Cites Work

• Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
• A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem.
• On the core of network synthesis games
• Optimal equilibria in the non-cooperative game associated with cost spanning tree problem
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
• Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
• Pricing traffic in a spanning network
• Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties
• Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Bayesian Implementation
• Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree

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