Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
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Publication:5247620
DOI10.1287/moor.2014.0651zbMath1310.91013arXiv1402.3610OpenAlexW2110243058MaRDI QIDQ5247620
Adam Wierman, Jason R. Marden, Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan
Publication date: 24 April 2015
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.3610
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (19)
A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ Cost-Sharing in Generalised Selfish Routing ⋮ Tight Bounds for Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games ⋮ Weighted and near weighted potential games with application to game theoretic control ⋮ Potential differential games ⋮ Shapley value-based payment calculation for energy exchange between micro- and utility grids ⋮ Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally ⋮ Cost-sharing strategy for carbon emission reduction and sales effort: a Nash game with government subsidy ⋮ Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games ⋮ Dynamic potential games: the discrete-time stochastic case ⋮ Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games ⋮ Congestion games with priority-based scheduling ⋮ Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty ⋮ A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares ⋮ Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games ⋮ On the Price of Anarchy of cost-sharing in real-time scheduling systems ⋮ Topological price of anarchy bounds for clustering games on networks ⋮ The Buck-Passing Game ⋮ Equilibria in Multiclass and Multidimensional Atomic Congestion Games
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