Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0210-3MaRDI QIDQ2385122zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan

Publication date 11 October 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

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• Sharing costs in some distinguished location problems

Cites work

• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
• Sequencing games
• The split core for sequencing games

Cited in

(11)

• Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
• Cost allocation in rescheduling with machine unavailable period
• Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
• Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
• Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems
• Capacity allocation games without an initial sequence
• Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
• Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem
• Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
• Shapley value for parallel machine sequencing situation without initial order

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