Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3zbMath1180.90132OpenAlexW3123365255MaRDI QIDQ2385122

Bharath Rangarajan, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35)

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Cites Work

• Sequencing games
• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• The split core for sequencing games
• Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
• On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs