Cost-sharing in generalised selfish routing
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Publication:5283373
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_23zbMATH Open1489.91013OpenAlexW2605863518MaRDI QIDQ5283373FDOQ5283373
Konstantinos Kollias, Grammateia Kotsialou, Martin Gairing
Publication date: 21 July 2017
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_23
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Cites Work
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- Price of Stability in Polynomial Congestion Games
- Sharing Non-anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally
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- Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Multi-job Scheduling Games
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