Cost-sharing in generalised selfish routing
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Publication:5283373
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_23zbMATH Open1489.91013OpenAlexW2605863518MaRDI QIDQ5283373FDOQ5283373
Authors: Martin Gairing, Konstantinos Kollias, Grammateia Kotsialou
Publication date: 21 July 2017
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_23
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Cites Work
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Cited In (6)
- Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
- Cost sharing, capacity investment and pricing in networks
- How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium
- A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares
- Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions
- Selfish transportation games
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