Atomic Congestion Games Among Coalitions

DOI10.1007/11786986_50zbMath1223.91015WikidataQ59818626 ScholiaQ59818626MaRDI QIDQ3613791

Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 12 March 2009

Published in: Automata, Languages and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/11786986_50

zbMATH Keywords

coalitions; game theory; price of anarchy; convergence to equilibria; atomic congestion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

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