Shapley value-based payment calculation for energy exchange between micro- and utility grids

DOI10.3390/G8040045MaRDI QIDQ1656982zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robin Pilling, Shi Chung Chang, Peter B. Luh

Publication date 13 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040045

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative game theoryenergy exchangemicrogrid economicsShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Review text

Summary: In recent years, microgrids have developed as important parts of power systems and have provided affordable, reliable, and sustainable supplies of electricity. Each microgrid is managed as a single controllable entity with respect to the existing power system but demands for joint operation and sharing the benefits between a microgrid and its hosting utility. This paper is focused on the joint operation of a microgrid and its hosting utility, which cooperatively minimize daily generation costs through energy exchange, and presents a payment calculation scheme for power transactions based on a fair allocation of reduced generation costs. To fairly compensate for energy exchange between the micro- and utility grids, we adopt the cooperative game theoretic solution concept of Shapley value. We design a case study for a fictitious interconnection model between the Mueller microgrid in Austin, Texas and the utility grid in Taiwan. Our case study shows that when compared to standalone generations, both the micro- and utility grids are better off when they collaborate in power exchange regardless of their individual contributions to the power exchange coalition.

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Cites work

• Cost sharing
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus

Cited in

(5)

• Formation of stable and efficient social storage cloud
• Energy trading game for microgrids using reinforcement learning
• Coalitional game theoretic method to study multi-microgrids cooperation condition considering outage risk
• Peer-to-peer energy trading
• The improved Shapley model of multi-party cooperation profit distribution in trans-provincial power transactions

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