Near-optimal network design with selfish agents

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Publication:3581253

DOI10.1145/780542.780617zbMath1192.68019OpenAlexW2121907157MaRDI QIDQ3581253

Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler, Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/780542.780617




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