When ignorance helps: graphical multicast cost sharing games

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.10.007MaRDI QIDQ844895zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

game theorygraphical multi castNash equilibriumsharing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
• Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
• Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
• Approximation and Online Algorithms
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Dynamic Steiner Tree Problem
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5764861 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3805303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multicast Transmissions in Non-cooperative Networks with a Limited Number of Selfish Moves
• Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
• Network formation games with local coalitions
• On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations
• On the value of coordination in network design
• Selfish Routing with Oblivious Users
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
• Structural Information and Communication Complexity
• The Price of Nash Equilibria in Multicast Transmissions Games
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(17)

• Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game
• On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
• Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior
• On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games
• Multicast network design game on a ring
• When Ignorance Helps: Graphical Multicast Cost Sharing Games
• Social context congestion games
• Designing networks with good equilibria under uncertainty
• Efficient black-box reductions for separable cost sharing
• Efficient black-box reductions for separable cost sharing
• Bayesian ignorance
• Designing networks with good equilibria under uncertainty
• Local and global price of anarchy of graphical games
• Graphical congestion games
• The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
• Bayesian ignorance
• Competitive routing over time

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