Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00176-3zbMath1080.90014OpenAlexW2045287955MaRDI QIDQ1885423

Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott J. Shenker

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00176-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic network models in operations research (90B15)

Related Items (16)

Network QoS games: stability vs optimality tradeoff ⋮ Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games ⋮ When ignorance helps: graphical multicast cost sharing games ⋮ On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks ⋮ Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks ⋮ Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games ⋮ Hardness results for multicast cost sharing. ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling under general demand settings ⋮ A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing ⋮ Designing fast converging cost sharing methods for multicast transmissions ⋮ The Price of Nash Equilibria in Multicast Transmissions Games ⋮ Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Trouble comes in threes: core stability in minimum cost connection networks ⋮ Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines ⋮ Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

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