Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
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Publication:604756
DOI10.1007/S10878-009-9209-XzbMATH Open1205.91044OpenAlexW2111234732MaRDI QIDQ604756FDOQ604756
Xiangyang Li, Wei Lou, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang
Publication date: 12 November 2010
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.142.5020
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Cites Work
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- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
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- Algorithmic Applications in Management
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- The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Cited In (8)
- A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
- Algorithmic Applications in Management
- Algorithms and Computation
- STACS 2005
- Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
- A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set
- Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games
- Allocating costs in set covering problems
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