Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.09.024MaRDI QIDQ1041237zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiangyang Li, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Chu, Shaojie Tang, Ping Xu

Publication date 1 December 2009

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024

zbMATH Keywords

designstrategyagentfunctioncover games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Greedy Heuristic for the Set-Covering Problem
• A course in game theory.
• Algorithmic Applications in Management
• Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• Incentives in Teams
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• STACS 2005
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(9)

• On the impact of local taxes in a set cover game
• Algorithmic Applications in Management
• STACS 2005
• A distributed algorithm for a set cover game
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
• A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set
• Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games

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