Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.09.024zbMATH Open1182.91021OpenAlexW2043031969MaRDI QIDQ1041237FDOQ1041237

Shaojie Tang, Xiangyang Li, Ping Xu, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Chu

Publication date: 1 December 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024

zbMATH Keywords

designstrategyagentfunctioncover games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

Cites Work

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• A Greedy Heuristic for the Set-Covering Problem
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• STACS 2005
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• Algorithmic Applications in Management
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms

Cited In (6)

• A distributed algorithm for a set cover game
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
• A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set
• Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games

Recommendations

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