Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2009.09.024zbMATH Open1182.91021OpenAlexW2043031969MaRDI QIDQ1041237FDOQ1041237
Authors: Xiangyang Li, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Chu, Shaojie Tang, Ping Xu 
Publication date: 1 December 2009
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024
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Noncooperative games (91A10) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)
Cites Work
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- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
- STACS 2005
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
- Algorithmic Applications in Management
- New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Cited In (9)
- On the impact of local taxes in a set cover game
- Algorithmic Applications in Management
- STACS 2005
- A distributed algorithm for a set cover game
- Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
- Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
- Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
- A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set
- Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games
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