Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024zbMath1182.91021OpenAlexW2043031969MaRDI QIDQ1041237

Shaojie Tang, Xiang-Yang Li, Ping Xu, Zheng Sun, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Chu

Publication date: 1 December 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024

zbMATH Keywords

designagentstrategyfunctioncover games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (3)

A game theoretic approach for minimal connected dominating set ⋮ Non-cooperative facility location and covering games ⋮ A distributed algorithm for a set cover game

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