Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_29zbMath1406.91153arXiv1610.00901OpenAlexW2527756521MaRDI QIDQ2959848

Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Amanatidis

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.00901

zbMATH Keywords

weighted matchingprocurement auctionbudgeted mechanism designweighted coverage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (12)

Truthful fair division without free disposal ⋮ Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World ⋮ Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design ⋮ Budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with divisible agents ⋮ Fractionally Subadditive Maximization under an Incremental Knapsack Constraint with Applications to Incremental Flows ⋮ Multiple birds with one stone: beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination ⋮ Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents ⋮ Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids ⋮ Fractionally subadditive maximization under an incremental knapsack constraint ⋮ Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

Cites Work

• On linear and semidefinite programming relaxations for hypergraph matching
• Pipage rounding: a new method of constructing algorithms with proven performance guarantee
• Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
• Optimal Auction Design
• Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design
• Budget feasible mechanism design
• Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices
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