Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_29zbMath1406.91153arXiv1610.00901MaRDI QIDQ2959848

Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Amanatidis

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.00901

zbMATH Keywords

weighted matching; procurement auction; budgeted mechanism design; weighted coverage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91-04: Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance