Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17zbMath1437.91129arXiv1703.10681OpenAlexW3162570136MaRDI QIDQ2190400

Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi, Éva Tardos

Publication date: 18 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10681

zbMATH Keywords

budget feasible mechanism designcrowdsourcing marketmonotone submodular function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (5)

Mechanisms for dual-role-facility location games: truthfulness and approximability ⋮ Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations ⋮ Budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with divisible agents ⋮ Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids ⋮ Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

Cites Work

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• A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint
• The budgeted maximum coverage problem
• Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations
• Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design
• On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
• Budget feasible mechanism design

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