Graphical congestion games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:639291
DOI10.1007/s00453-010-9417-xzbMath1229.91078OpenAlexW2027284184MaRDI QIDQ639291
Luca Moscardelli, Michele Flammini, Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli
Publication date: 20 September 2011
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9417-x
Nash equilibriumcongestion gamesprice of anarchyalgorithmic game theoryprice of stabilitysocial knowledge
Related Items (8)
Graphical potential games ⋮ Coordination games on graphs ⋮ Social context congestion games ⋮ Congestion games with capacitated resources ⋮ Inefficiency of games with social context ⋮ The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets ⋮ Convergence Dynamics of Graphical Congestion Games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Worst-case equilibria
- Congestion games with malicious players
- Coordination mechanisms
- When ignorance helps: graphical multicast cost sharing games
- Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games
- Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Congestion games revisited
- Selfish routing with incomplete information
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Non-cooperative games
- The small-world phenomenon
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge
- The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games
- Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing
- Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
- Convergence and Approximation in Potential Games
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
This page was built for publication: Graphical congestion games
