Congestion games with malicious players
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Publication:834852
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.017zbMATH Open1173.91301OpenAlexW2119603406MaRDI QIDQ834852FDOQ834852
Christos Papadimitriou, Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.017
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Cites Work
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- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
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Cited In (12)
- Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
- Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
- “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games
- Adversarial behavior in network games
- Graphical congestion games
- Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games
- Fault tolerance in large games
- Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
- Information diffusion in social sensing
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