Congestion games with malicious players

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.017zbMath1173.91301MaRDI QIDQ834852

Moshe Babaioff, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.017

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium; congestion games; selfish routing; malicious behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

Related Items

Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games, Information diffusion in social sensing, Graphical congestion games, Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism, Fault tolerance in large games, Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure, Adversarial behavior in network games, Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria, Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games, Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

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