Fault tolerance in large games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.007MaRDI QIDQ2016249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfault tolerancelarge games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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Cites work

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• Fault Tolerant Implementation
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• Multiagent Learning in Large Anonymous Games
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• Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
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Cited in

(14)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7561639 (Why is no real title available?)
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Large strategic dynamic interactions
• Incentive-based fault-tolerant cooperative payoff design in weakly acyclic games
• PPAD-complete pure approximate Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games
• Independent mistakes in large games
• Partial exposure in large games
• Hotelling games in fault-prone settings
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
• PPAD-complete approximate pure Nash equilibria in Lipschitz games
• Beyond dominance and Nash: ranking equilibria by critical mass
• Multi-round cooperative search games with multiple players
• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
• Incentive-based fault tolerant control of evolutionary matrix games

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