Partial exposure in large games
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Publication:2268112
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.09.006zbMATH Open1201.91005OpenAlexW2029241650MaRDI QIDQ2268112FDOQ2268112
Authors: Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold 
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.006
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Cites Work
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
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- Large Robust Games
- Categorizing others in a large game
- On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
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- On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
- Behavioral conformity in games with many players
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- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Fault tolerance in large games
- Players' effects under limited independence
Cited In (9)
- \(t\)-wise independence with local dependencies
- Independent mistakes in large games
- Fault tolerance in large games
- The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games
- A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games
- Large games with transformed summary statistics
- Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
- Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
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