Behavioral conformity in games with many players
From MaRDI portal
Publication:863284
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.09.006zbMATH Open1153.91374OpenAlexW2163243748MaRDI QIDQ863284FDOQ863284
Authors: Myrna Wooders, Reinhard Selten, Edward J. P. Cartwright 
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15773
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
- Large Robust Games
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
- Equivalence of Games and Markets
- Elimination of Randomization in Certain Problems of Statistics and of the Theory of Games
- Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games
Cited In (17)
- On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
- Learning from like-minded people
- Game-theoretic models of collective conformity behavior
- Partial exposure in large games
- Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces
- Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium
- An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
- Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?
- Externality effects in the formation of societies
- Categorizing others in a large game
- Opportunistic conformism
- Networks and stability
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
- Game-theory models of binary collective behavior
- Game-theoretic models of binary collective behavior
- On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
This page was built for publication: Behavioral conformity in games with many players
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863284)
