Behavioral conformity in games with many players
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Cites work
- Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games
- Elimination of Randomization in Certain Problems of Statistics and of the Theory of Games
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- Equivalence of Games and Markets
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Large Robust Games
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
Cited in
(17)- On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
- Learning from like-minded people
- Game-theoretic models of collective conformity behavior
- Partial exposure in large games
- Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces
- Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium
- An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
- Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?
- Externality effects in the formation of societies
- Categorizing others in a large game
- Opportunistic conformism
- Networks and stability
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
- On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
- Game-theory models of binary collective behavior
- Game-theoretic models of binary collective behavior
- On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
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