Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.002zbMath1156.91008OpenAlexW2066720400MaRDI QIDQ2519059

Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 22 January 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley-Folkman theoremBayesian gamespurificationpure strategiesBayesian-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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The Shapley-Folkman theorem and the range of a bounded measure: an elementary and unified treatment ⋮ Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games ⋮ On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players ⋮ Large but finite games with asymmetric information ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations

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