Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?

DOI10.3390/G1020137MaRDI QIDQ2344934zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christine Grüning, Wolfgang Peters

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020137

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationinternational environmental agreementsjustice and fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) History, political science (91F10)

Review text

Summary: The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries' preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases.

Recommendations

• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Behavioral conformity in games with many players

Cited in

(4)

• An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods
• Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game

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