Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?

DOI10.3390/G1020137zbMATH Open1311.91158OpenAlexW2011328703MaRDI QIDQ2344934FDOQ2344934

Authors: Christine Grüning, Wolfgang Peters 

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020137

Recommendations

• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationinternational environmental agreementsjustice and fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Behavioral conformity in games with many players

Cited In (4)

• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
• Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game
• Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods

This page was built for publication: Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2344934)