Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements?

DOI10.3390/G1020137MaRDI QIDQ2344934zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christine Grüning, Wolfgang Peters

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020137

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationinternational environmental agreementsjustice and fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Behavioral conformity in games with many players

Cited in

(4)

• Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game
• Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods
• An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment

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