Recommendations
Cites work
- Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
- Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in dynamic games
- Reputation with observed actions
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Cited in
(15)- Pivotal players and the characterization of influence
- Large strategic dynamic interactions
- College assignment as a large contest
- Distributed control of multi-agent systems with random parameters and a major agent
- Partial exposure in large games
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Inference for games with many players
- Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2004
- Large nonanonymous repeated games
- Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
- Identifying the deviator
- Mean-field approximation of forward-looking population dynamics
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