When are nonanonymous players negligible?

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2373zbMath0911.90358OpenAlexW1990864754MaRDI QIDQ1268593

Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Publication date: 16 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203775

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium setlarge number of opponentssingle large player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (10)

Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Distributed control of multi-agent systems with random parameters and a major agent ⋮ Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games ⋮ Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions ⋮ The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ Partial exposure in large games ⋮ Large nonanonymous repeated games ⋮ Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case ⋮ Pivotal players and the characterization of influence

Cites Work

• Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
• Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
• Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation with observed actions
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

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