Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4008555
DOI10.2307/2297864zbMath0763.90108OpenAlexW1554995057MaRDI QIDQ4008555
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63849
Related Items (48)
Games with espionage ⋮ Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships ⋮ Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem ⋮ Order of limits in reputations ⋮ Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents ⋮ Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Ransomware and reputation ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria ⋮ Audited reputation ⋮ Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics ⋮ Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning ⋮ Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust ⋮ Bad reputation with simple rating systems ⋮ Repeated communication with private lying costs ⋮ Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game ⋮ Reputation from nested activities ⋮ Reputation and news suppression in the media industry ⋮ Posterior probabilities: dominance and optimism ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Imperfect memory and choice under risk ⋮ Information asymmetry and reentry ⋮ Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game ⋮ When is reputation bad? ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Bounded memory and incomplete information ⋮ Sustainable reputations with rating systems ⋮ Reputation and impermanent types ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Introducing to the evolution of preferences ⋮ Inspection games with long-run inspectors ⋮ Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns ⋮ Commitment and observability in games ⋮ Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets ⋮ A model of gradual information disclosure ⋮ Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. ⋮ Reputation and exogenous private learning ⋮ When are nonanonymous players negligible? ⋮ Reputation with observed actions ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
This page was built for publication: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
