Games with espionage

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00177-5zbMath1077.91002MaRDI QIDQ1885430

Leeat Yariv, Eilon Solan

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

EspionageInformation pricingSemi-correlated equilibriaTiming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (12)

Game theory with translucent players ⋮ On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games ⋮ Optimal strategies in the fighting fantasy gaming system: influencing stochastic dynamics by gambling with limited resource ⋮ Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment ⋮ Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion ⋮ Feigning ignorance for long-term gains ⋮ Entry and espionage with noisy signals ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing ⋮ Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games ⋮ Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects ⋮ Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Information leakage forces cooperation
• On the value of information in a strategic conflict
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• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
• Potential games
• Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• The Demand for (Differentiated) Information
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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