Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games
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Publication:976528
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
- Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Differential Game Solutions to an Investment and Pricing Problem
- Dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop complete information
- Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
- Fundamental symmetries and qualitative properties in the adjustment cost model of the firm
- Games with espionage
- On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
- Optimal investment, financing, and dividends. A Stackelberg differential game
- Pollution control: A differential game approach
- The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
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Cited in
(7)- Nonlinear dynamics from discrete time two-player status-seeking games
- The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games
- Nonlinear dynamics of discrete time multi-level leader-follower games
- The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games
- Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games
- Comparative dynamics in differential games: a note on the differentiability of solutions
- Intertemporal contracting in a supply chain
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